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Abstract
A major component of tax administration reform in sub-Saharan Africa for the last 30 years has been
the creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs). The effects of their creation on revenue
performance have been much debated, although there are only a few quantitative studies. The core
argument of this paper is that existing research suggesting diverse and contradictory outcomes has
not taken account of trends in revenue performance in the years before the establishment of SARAs.
Allowing for this revenue history our analysis based on 46 countries over the period 1980-2015 pro-
vides no robust evidence that SARAs induce an increase in revenue performance. This does not imply
that SARAs may not provide benefits for tax collection, but they do not demonstrably increase (or
decrease) revenue collected.
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1 Introduction
Increasing domestic resource mobilisation has been a key objective of international efforts to boost
economic development. However, taxation and particularly its administration remain severely con-
strained in much of the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where political corruption
and patronage are said to be particularly problematic. Since the 1990s, reforms have increasingly fo-
cussed on ring-fencing tax collection from political interference by setting up semi-autonomous revenue
authorities (SARAs), which operate at arm’s length from the ministry of finance.
This political autonomy should improve tax compliance and collection compared to conventional tax
administrations (Fjeldstad, 2009). Tax compliance might be low because government use their taxing
powers in discretionary ways which might erode citizens’ trust in their governments. By handing over
control to an independent authority, governments can signal a credible commitment to a fairer and
less discretionary collection process, which should boost compliance (Chand and Moene, 1999; Talier-
cio, 2004). Alternatively, increases in HR, budget, organisational and financial autonomy might create
the managerial space and flexibility needed to overcome rigid civil service structures allowing the ad-
ministration to operate more effectively (Devas et al., 2001; Kidd and Crandall, 2006). Moreover, if
SARAs are allowed to retain a percentage of the collected revenue, an explicit incentive for increased
revenue collection is institutionalised (Toma and Toma, 1992). However, to the extent to which dif-
ferent SARAs share the same institutional blueprint, there is a risk that the reform remains blind to
local political and societal sensitivities and might therefore result in “square pegs for round holes” or
isomorphic mimicry (Andrews, 2013; Pritchett et al., 2013). Moreover, by removing power from the
executive the SARA reform could threaten the political bargain underlying the fiscal equilibrium and
thereby undermine its own sustainability (Bird, 2008; Di John and Putzel, 2009; Therkildsen, 2004;
Von Soest, 2006; Von Schiller, 2016).
Empirically, the revenue impact of SARAs is still unclear. At best, there is evidence for an initial,
but unsustained revenue increase. Jenkins et al. (2000) conclude that experiences worldwide have
been “impressive”. However, initial increases were often not sustained nor caused by SARAs (Devas
et al., 2001; Fjeldstad, 2009). Comparative case studies stress the importance of the political context
for the effectiveness of SARAs (Di John, 2010; Mann, 2004; Von Soest, 2008). Econometric models,
not accounting for revenue dynamics, find a positive effect. von Haldenwang et al. (2014) show that
Peruvian municipalities with a SARA collect more tax than municipalities without one. Ahlerup et al.
(2015) conclude that in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) the introduction of a SARA resulted in an initial
but unsustained revenue increase. Employing synthetic control methods, Ebeke et al. (2016) find a
positive revenue effect, while Sarr’s (2016) results suggest considerable cross-country heterogeneity.
This paper re-evaluates the revenue gains from unified semi-autonomous revenue authorities in
SSA as compared to conventional tax administrations. Relying on a panel of 46 countries between
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1980 and 2015, we estimate this effect using, for the first time, dynamic panel methods to account
for trends in revenue collection in the years before the establishment of SARAs. Contrary to earlier
studies, our results fail to provide any evidence for a systematic relationship between the presence of
a semi-autonomous revenue authority and total tax revenue in SSA. This conclusion also holds when
we go beyond the total revenue effect and look at direct, goods and services, and trade taxation. As a
robustness check, we extend the analysis to a number of alternative measures of fiscal capacity. Again,
we do not find any evidence for an impact of SARAs. This approach does not allow us to examine
potential differences across SARAs. The results should thus be interpreted as an effect on average.
Figure 1: Tax ratio relative to the introduction of a SARA
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Notes: Figure 1 shows the averaged tax-to-GDP-ratio in logs of countries which adopted a SARA,
and this from 10 years before to 10 years after the introduction of a SARA. The data was centred
so that the introduction of a SARA in all countries takes place in year 0.
The paper contributes to the literature by addressing three challenges faced by existing empirical
studies. First, by taking into account pre-reform revenue trends, this paper provides more reliable
estimates of the revenue effect of SARAs. As shown in Figure 1, the introduction of a SARA appears
to be preceded by a temporary drop in the tax-to-GDP-ratio.1 This negative pre-reform shock either
indicates that taxpayers anticipate the disruption associated with the introduction of a SARA and
decrease their compliance or that governments introduce a SARA in response to the experience of a
revenue shock. While anything we say is speculative, the former seems less likely given the temporary
nature of the dip and the uncertainty that is usually associated with the timing of these reforms. The
latter seems more plausible insofar as major reforms like this usually follow a window of opportunity.
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A revenue crisis might create the domestic political space which the donor community can use to put a
SARA on the agenda. The observation that SARAs are often established under severe donor pressure
– which we incorporate in the empirical analysis – lends support to this interpretation. Given that
governments are not very nimble, the creation of a SARA typically takes some years. This is consistent
with the timing in Figure 1, which shows a lag on average of four years between the revenue shortfall
and the introduction of the SARA. Moreover, this matches some case study evidence; according to
Mascagni (2016), revenue problems were a trigger for the tax administration reforms leading to the
establishment of the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority. Either way, if not accounted for, as
is the case in the existing literature, a pre-reform dip in revenue leads to an overestimation of the
revenue effect of SARAs, just as failure to account for the prior trend will bias estimates of the impact
of a treatment (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman and Smith, 1999).
Second, existing measures of SARAs are often imprecise, resulting in situations where countries
are coded as having a SARA whereas in reality there is no such institution present.2 Moreover, except
for Sarr (2016), the data sources underlying existing studies are often unclear. This leads to serious
discrepancies in reported establishment years, as documented in Table A.1 in the Appendix. We over-
come this by being precise and transparent about our SARA definition and by relying on primary data
sources for our coding. Following Kidd and Crandall (2006), we define a SARA as a governance regime
for an organisation engaged in revenue administration that provides for more autonomy than that af-
forded a normal department in a ministry, but we extend it by imposing that it integrates customs and
tax operations. This is motivated by the fact that all African SARAs now integrate these functions.
With the exception of Mann (2004), no study makes the distinction between the legal and operational
establishment of a SARA, despite the existence of significant gaps between the adoption of the rele-
vant legislation and the start of operations in some cases. We recognise this possibility and exploit
additional data sources to ensure that our SARA measure captures operational establishment.
Finally, even when accounting for prior trends in tax revenue, we cannot be completely certain
that the presence of a SARA is not correlated with other unobservables. Therefore, we instrument
the presence of a SARA with an identification strategy based on the observation that SARAs are more
likely to be established when the UK is an influential donor compared to situations where France is an
important donor. Hence, we exploit the variation in the relative contributions by the UK and France
to total aid in individual African countries to proxy for their agenda setting power. The underlying as-
sumption is that these aid shares affect the presence of a SARA, but do not directly affect tax revenue,
conditional on a number of controls. This instrumental variable (IV) strategy gives results similar to
our baseline findings.
Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 introduces the dynamic and IV frameworks used in the sub-
sequent empirical analyses. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 examines the robustness
of the results, and section 6 concludes.
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2 Data
For our analysis of the revenue effect of SARAs we use an unbalanced panel dataset covering 49 sub-
Saharan African countries over the period 1980-2015. We exclude only South Sudan and Somalia
because of data limitations, as well as Zimbabwe because of a small number of extremely influential
observations.3 Out of the remaining 46 countries, 21 established a semi-autonomous revenue authority
during the period under consideration.4
As mentioned above, the coding of revenue administrations is often vague in existing empirical
studies. Hence, to achieve reproducibility, we attempt to be more transparent and precise about how
we classify revenue administrations. We classify a tax administration as a SARA if it is formally
located outside the ministerial structure, is endowed with an independent legal status and integrates
both customs and tax functions. This is a minimal definition that makes it possible to compare the
revenue performance of SARAs with that of conventional tax administrations. However, while they
share many elements, there is variation in the nature of SARAs with respect to their competences,
organisational set-up, and responsibilities. Moreover, there might well be differences across SARAs in
terms of their de facto autonomy from the ministry of finance. While there is no empirical evidence
on these differences, their existence cannot be ruled out. This is a potential limitation of most of
the empirical literature on SARAs, including of this study. We capture the average effect of SARAs,
potentially masking heterogeneity among SARAs. We leave it to future research to identify and classify
heterogeneity among SARAs.
Once countries with a SARA are identified, we create a dummy variable taking the value one if a
SARA was present in a given year. In line with Mann (2004), we recognise that there might exist sig-
nificant gaps between the legal creation and the operational start of the new revenue administration.
Swaziland, for example, adopted the legal framework in 2008, but its SARA only became operational in
2011. Operational establishment is arguably the main variable of interest. The dummy thus captures
the operational presence of the SARA not the legal presence. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides an
overview of countries and dates, and includes the data sources used for the coding.
The main dependent variable for this study is government tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
which is obtained from the Government Revenue Dataset (GRD), version July 2017 (Prichard et al.,
2014). This dataset has become the go-to revenue dataset for developing countries. While not with-
out issues, its coverage, scope and consistency outperform the available alternatives, leading to a re-
assessment of some of the existing research on taxation and development (Prichard, 2016). The GRD
provides detailed information on various individual taxes as a share of GDP at both the central and
general government level. In this paper, we focus on the general government and retain the main tax
categories: total tax revenue, direct tax revenue, tax revenue from goods and services and international
trade tax revenue.
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Figure 2: Average tax revenue
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Notes: Figure 2 shows the evolution of the averaged tax-to-GDP-ratio for countries which
adopted a SARA and countries that did not, respectively the full line and the dotted line.
Figure 2 plots the time series of total tax revenue for our sample of 46 countries, split into two
groups: SARA-adopters and non-adopters. The figure illustrates the stylised fact that revenue mo-
bilisation in sub-Saharan Africa remains low (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Keen and Mansour, 2010b).
Nevertheless, there seems to be an upward trend since the mid-2000s. More interesting to our argu-
ment; it shows that SARA-adopters have, on average, a higher tax ratio than non-adopters. However,
this divergence occurred before the rise of the SARA in SSA, which started around 1990. This pattern
should caution us against over-relying on between group comparisons, as it might induce a bias in
favour of SARAs. This observation further strengthens our belief that revenue histories are important
in the analysis of the SARA reform.
For some parts of our analysis we use additional variables and control variables. All controls vari-
ables are standard in the taxation literature (for example, Gupta, 2007; Keen and Mansour, 2010a;
Morrissey et al., 2016). For our instrumental variable estimation we use data on aid flows from donor i
to recipient j in combination with information on total aid flowing to country j to calculate the relative
shares. In the final section, where we look at corruption, we will employ the new Varieties of Democ-
racy dataset to obtain disaggregated measures of corruption. The precise definitions and sources of all
the variables used in this paper are found in Table A.3 in the Appendix, while summary statistics can
be found in Table A.4. As is common when working with macro data, we will use the log transforma-
tion of all continuous economic variables in our estimations to prevent the results from being biased
by outliers.
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3 Methodology
The existing empirical literature imposes a strict exogeneity assumption on the relationship between
SARAs and revenue. That is, it assumes that the presence of a SARA is unrelated with past and future
revenue collection. Given Figure 1, our concern is that this is unlikely to be true as past revenue might
influence the decision to adopt a SARA. Failing to take this into account will bias upwards the revenue
effect of SARAs (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Accounting for past revenue should therefore bring down
the SARA coefficient and provide a more reliable estimate of the revenue effect.
3.1 Dynamic Models
The core of this paper is built around two dynamic panel models which take into account past revenue
performance. Since each model has its own assumptions, we include both to show that our results are
independent of the chosen approach. All models compare SARAs to conventional tax administrations,
assuming away potential differences in operational features across SARAs.
Our first dynamic model is the standard within or fixed effects estimator to which we add a lag of
the dependent variable (LDV):
yi,t = βdi,t + γyi,t−1 + αi + δt + i,t (1)
where the dependent variable is the log of tax revenue as a share of GDP in country i at time t,
and di,t is the dichotomous variable capturing the operational presence of a semi-autonomous revenue
authority in country i at time t. In a variation, the SARA reform is captured by a set of dummies which
correspond to the time relative to the introduction of the authority, similar to the approach taken in
(Ahlerup et al., 2015). This addresses the concern that strict exogeneity of the treatment fails due
to persistence in the reform (Wooldridge, 2010). The coefficient β thus captures the revenue effect of
SARAs. The vector αi denotes a full set of country fixed effects, while δt is a full set of year effects and
i,t is a standard error term. The effect of lagged tax revenue, yi,t−1, on current revenue is captured
by γ. By including this LDV, we estimate the revenue effect of SARAs while keeping past revenue
fixed. We thus control for revenue histories. Unfortunately, the within estimator with a LDV is not
asymptotically consistent when the number of time periods is small (Nickell, 1981). In our sample
each country is, on average, observed 32 times. This should be enough for a nearly negligible level of
bias in β (Judson and Owen, 1999). Therefore, this will be our baseline model.
A (system) GMM estimation would address the possibility of Nickell bias since it produces consis-
tent estimates for dynamic panel models. However, the (system) GMM was developed for short panels;
with longer ones there is a danger of instrument proliferation, which could undermine the validity of
the results (Roodman, 2009). When dealing with macro-panels, which often involve many time pe-
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riods, the (system) GMM estimator is thus not appropriate. Moreover, (system) GMM also assumes
parameter homogeneity, cross-section independence and stationarity. These first two assumptions can
be relaxed if we move to macro-panel methods known as panel time-series, and in particular to mean
group estimators such as the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator (CCEMG) (Pesaran
and Smith, 1995). Allowing for heterogeneous parameters is a particularly important advantage over
GMM which will be biased if the true effect of SARAs is heterogeneous across countries (Soderbom
et al., 2015). Additionally, CCEMG estimators recognise that error terms might have a multi-factor
structure. That is, in addition to country-specific and time-specific unobservables, there can also be
time-specific unobservables which affect different countries differently. Failing to control for the latter
would lead to cross-section bias. CCEMG estimators introduce cross-section means of the dependent
and independent variables into the estimation to account for this (Pesaran, 2006).
The original model was recently extended to allow for lagged dependent variables (Chudik and Pe-
saran, 2015). When a single lagged dependent variable is included the estimator will gain consistency
if 3
√
T lags of the cross-section means are added, formally:
yi,t = βidi,t + γiyi,t−1 +
p∑
l=0
δi,lz¯t−l + i,t (2)
where z¯t = (y¯t−1, x¯t), p is the number of lags (which in our case will be three, given that T = 32.5). We
test for cross-section dependence (CD) using Pesaran’s(2004) test.
3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
To deal with time-varying omitted variables, we resort to an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. The
motivation for our IV strategy builds on the observation that SARAs are often established under severe
donor pressure. Case study evidence suggests that the United Kingdom, in particular, has championed
SARA reform in the developing world (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen, 2008; Fjeldstad, 2009; Von Soest,
2006; Devas et al., 2001). This is in contrast to France which, traditionally, favours more centralist
policies (Schedler and Proeller, 2002). Comparing French and UK aid programmes, Caulfield (2006)
finds that the latter focus more heavily on the establishment of executive agencies, such as SARAs,
in SSA. The observation that there are hardly any SARAs in francophone Africa further supports this
argument. Hence, the assumption underlying the IV strategy is that SARAs are more likely in country
i, if the UK has more agenda setting power in that country. In contrast, SARAs should be less likely
when France is a more important donor. We operationalise the agenda setting power of the UK and
France by calculating their aid contributions relative to the total aid received by country i.
As applied in Adams et al. (2009), we follow a three-step procedure described by Wooldridge (2010).
This means that (i) we estimate a binary response model (e.g. probit) of di,t on qi,t and a set of controls
xi,t , (ii) we compute the fitted probabilities pˆ, and (iii) estimate β using a two-stage least squares model
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with pˆ ÌC´ as an instrument for the presence of a SARA. This leads us to a three-step procedure, which
differs from the “pseudo-IV” procedure of running an OLS regression of y on pˆ and x. In contrast to the
latter, the usual 2SLS standard errors are still asymptotically valid under the three-step procedure
(Wooldridge, 2010, p.939). Moreover, the approach takes the binary nature of the endogenous variable
into account. This gives the following probit model: di,t on qi,t and a set of controls xi,t:
Pr(di,t = 1|qi,t, xi,t) = Φ(θ0 + θ1UKAidSharei,t + θ2FrAidSharei,t + φxi,t) (3)
where Φ(−) is the cumulative distribution function, xi,t is a vector of control variables which in-
cludes: total net aid received by country i, the identity of the former coloniser, the presence of a short-
and mid-term IMF programme and a linear time trend. Next, we compute the fitted probabilities pˆ.
Finally, we estimate β using a two-stage least squares model with pˆ as the instrument:
yi,t = βdi,t + µ1xi,t + αi + δt + i,t
di,t = pipˆi,t + µ2xi,t + αi + δt + ui,t (4)
3.2.1 Identification assumption
The identification strategy relies on the exclusion restriction that, conditional on the included controls,
the agenda setting power of the UK and France, as captured by their relative aid contributions, only
affects taxation through the SARA reform.
A potential concern is that colonial histories might be related to both contemporary foreign aid
flows and fiscal capacity. This possibility cannot be ruled out given recent evidence; ? find that British
colonial rule, compared to French rule, has weakened state and fiscal capacity in African countries. On
the other hand, we know that colonial ties are a significant predictor of bilateral aid flows (Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2000). If not controlled for, the exclusion restriction would be violated since the aid shares
would pick up differences in tax revenue due to differences in colonial legacies. We deal with this in
two ways. First, an indicator variable for a country’s colonial past based on La Porta et al. (2008) is
included in the probit model to ensure that the instruments pick up more than colonial differences.
Second, the 2SLS estimation includes country fixed effects. Hence, colonial histories are accounted for.
Another concern is the relationship between aid and taxation. There is an extensive literature on
the potential effects of foreign aid levels on tax efforts in developing countries (Clist, 2016; Gupta et al.,
2004; Morrissey, 2015, for example,). However, we do not rely on aid levels, but we exploit changes
in the composition of the aid received. We use changes in UK and French aid as a share of total aid
received by country i. Nevertheless, to completely close this backdoor path, a measure for the total aid
level is included. A related concern is that the UK and France support additional public sector reforms
which potentially affect taxation. Following Ahlerup et al. (2015), we control for this by including
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variables for short and mid-term IMF programmes since these programmes are usually the basis of
any form of public sector reform in developing countries.
Finally, while we cannot directly test the exclusion restriction, we can run a placebo test. The test
consists of an estimation of the impact of UK and French aid on tax revenue for the countries and
periods when no SARA is present. If the exclusion restriction holds, that is if the aid shares only affect
taxation through their effect on SARAs, then the aid shares should not predict tax revenue when there
is no SARA present. As will be discussed in section 4.2, the results are satisfactory.
4 Results
4.1 Dynamic Models
Briefly reiterating our core motivation; the hypothesis is that lagged tax revenue is an omitted variable
in static models used in much of the existing literature. If this is the case, then the inclusion of lagged
tax revenue should bring down the SARA coefficient compared to existing studies.
In Table 1 we present the results of our dynamic models specified in section 3.1, but we also include
the results from a static fixed effects estimation as a benchmark. Each panel represents a different
type of tax with the relevant summary statistics and test statics included at the bottom of each panel.
Glancing over the columns, in the uneven numbered ones the SARA reform is captured by a single
before/after dummy variable, which tells us whether there is a break in revenue collection after the
SARA is introduced. In the even numbered columns the SARA reform is introduced as a set of dummies
capturing the time since the reform. The logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable allows
us to roughly interpret the coefficient on the SARA dummies as a percentage change. In order to save
space and highlight the most important coefficients, we do not report the fixed effects.
Columns I and II show the results from the static fixed effects estimator as, for example, found
in Ahlerup et al. (2015). According to this estimator the SARA reform has clearly had a positive
and significant effect on revenue collection. The results in column II suggest that SARAs have an
immediate impact during the first two years of 8.7 per cent or 1.3 percentage points, if we take the
average tax ratio of 14.5 per cent in the sample. This positive impact continues during the first 10
years after which the effect is still positive but no longer significantly different from zero. These results
are close to the ones obtained by Ahlerup et al. (2015) who find an increase of 1.5 percentage points
during the first two years. This effect on total tax revenue seems to be due to increases across the
different subcategories, with the exception of trade taxation which seems to have been least affected
by the SARA reform. In short, the findings in the static models are in line with the existing literature.
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Table 1: Dynamic panel - Revenue effect of SARAs
Stat. FE Dyn. FE CCEMG
I II III IV V VI
Panel A: Total tax revenue
SARA 0.094*** 0.011 0.010
(0.031) (0.019) (0.017)
SARA, years 1-2 0.087* 0.034 -0.003
(0.052) (0.030) (0.030)
SARA, years 3-5 0.111** 0.006 -0.007
(0.047) (0.028) (0.028)
SARA, years 6-10 0.109** 0.012 -0.011
(0.045) (0.027) (0.033)
SARA, years >10 0.056 -0.014 -0.020
(0.049) (0.029) (0.041)
L.Total 0.780*** 0.780*** 0.272** 0.251**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.126) (0.125)
N 1496 1496 1440 1440 1278 1278
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.082 0.081 0.674 0.674 0.304 0.329
CD p-val. 0.052 0.031
Panel B: Direct tax revenue
SARA 0.244*** 0.058** -0.017
(0.053) (0.029) (0.025)
SARA, years 1-2 0.193** 0.069 0.032
(0.082) (0.045) (0.023)
SARA, years 3-5 0.205*** 0.034 0.005
(0.073) (0.039) (0.044)
SARA, years 6-10 0.278*** 0.065 -0.077
(0.073) (0.040) (0.051)
SARA, years >10 0.384*** 0.086* -0.061
(0.083) (0.045) (0.053)
L.Direct 0.807*** 0.806*** 0.525*** 0.497***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.161) (0.163)
N 1196 1196 1134 1134 984 984
Groups 44 44 44 44 44 44
adj. R2 0.086 0.087 0.718 0.718 0.882 0.891
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Goods & services revenue
SARA 0.147*** 0.056* 0.009
(0.056) (0.031) (0.047)
SARA, years 1-2 0.108 0.105** 0.015
(0.087) (0.049) (0.039)
SARA, years 3-5 0.179** 0.045 0.090*
(0.077) (0.042) (0.051)
SARA, years 6-10 0.198** 0.050 0.094
(0.078) (0.043) (0.069)
SARA, years >10 0.007 -0.010 0.038
(0.089) (0.049) (0.069)
L.Goods & Services 0.794*** 0.793*** -0.096 -0.188
(0.017) (0.017) (0.147) (0.147)
N 1176 1176 1107 1107 928 928
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.160 0.162 0.738 0.738 0.322 0.358
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Panel D: Trade tax revenue
SARA 0.079 -0.013 -0.036
(0.064) (0.041) (0.026)
SARA, years 1-2 0.186* 0.027 0.028
(0.100) (0.066) (0.054)
SARA, years 3-5 0.151* -0.022 -0.059
Continued on next page
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(0.088) (0.056) (0.106)
SARA, years 6-10 -0.049 -0.038 0.015
(0.089) (0.057) (0.098)
SARA, years >10 -0.035 -0.005 0.109
(0.101) (0.065) (0.076)
L.Trade 0.793*** 0.793*** 0.197 0.192
(0.019) (0.020) (0.127) (0.140)
N 1212 1212 1144 1144 969 969
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.063 0.066 0.632 0.631 0.247 0.288
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. Columns I and II give the
results for the static fixed effects model. Columns III to VI contain the results from the dynamic estimations.
Panel A presents the estimates for total tax revenue; Panel B for direct tax revenue; Panel C for revenue
from goods and services and Panel D for trade tax revenue. Uneven columns include a single before and after
dummy, taking the value 1 if a SARA is present. Even columns include a series of SARA dummies capturing
posttreatment effects. Models I through IV account for country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses (significance indicated as *** p ≤ 0.01, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.1). Models V and VI were corrected for
small time series bias using Jackknife corrected standard errors. The p-value of the cross-section dependence
(CD) test is reported. The null-hypothesis is no cross-sectional dependence in the majority of the models.
The fixed effects estimator which includes past revenue is presented in columns III and IV. As
noted before, caution has to be exercised when interpreting the results, as the results might be sub-
ject to Nickell bias. Nevertheless, given our fairly long panel, the results should still be informative.
Compared to the static model the coefficient on the SARA dummy has dramatically decreased, and
now suggests a 1.1 per cent increase in revenue after the introduction of a SARA. However, it is no
longer statistically significant. The estimates in column IV point to an initial but unsustained gain of
about 3 per cent during the first two years. Again, none of the estimates are statistically significant
at standard levels. Importantly, the coefficient on lagged tax revenue, in a pattern common across all
models in this paper, is sizeable suggesting significant persistence in tax revenue. We test for a unit
root in Table A.5 in the Appendix. With respect to the main sub-components of total tax, there is some
evidence that SARAs have had a positive impact on revenue from direct taxes as well as from taxes on
goods and services. Column III suggests that SARAs have, on average, led to a 5.8 and 5.6 per cent
increase respectively. However, this only holds at the 5 per cent significance level. Moreover, this effect
is less clear if we look at column IV, and will disappear when we move to the CCEMG estimator. For
trade taxation, the findings indicate a negative, but statistically insignificant impact.
Overall, both models III and IV fail to reject the null-hypothesis of no effect on total tax revenue.
This is in line with our hypothesis that lagged revenue was an important omitted variable in static
models. When not accounted for, this led to an overestimation of the revenue effect of SARAs, possibly
due to the correlation between negative shocks to revenue in the past and the introduction of the SARA.
Based on these first findings we are, therefore, led to the initial conclusion that semi-autonomous
revenue authorities have not significantly increased total tax ratios in sub-Saharan Africa.
We also examine the results from the correlated common effects mean group models in columns
VII and VIII. CCEMG models are more appropriate than GMM when working with longer panels
and have the additional advantage that they allow us to control for cross-section dependence and
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heterogeneous effects. For total tax revenue, the coefficient on the SARA dummy in column VII is close
to the two previous estimates, but it remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. The results
in column VIII have turned negative and are never significant. The findings for the different types
of taxation are similar to what we found before. There is no significant effect on direct taxation, for
which the estimates turn around zero. For revenue from goods and services, the estimates are overall
insignificant, except for the period three to five years after the reform. However, the suggested impact
of 9 per cent is only marginally significant at the 10 per cent level. Again, there is no evidence for
an impact on trade taxation. We do have to note that despite our efforts to control for cross-sectional
dependence, the CD test rejects the null-hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence in the majority of
the models. Nevertheless, the CCEMG models confirm previous findings. There is little evidence for a
systematic relationship between the presence of a SARA and improved revenue performance.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
In the preceding section we examined the revenue effect of SARAs by controlling for past revenue. In
this section we recognise that we cannot exclude the possibility that there are still other time-varying
factors which might confound the revenue effect of SARAs. We resort to an instrumental variable
procedure to deal with this. As discussed in section 3.2, we use a three-step procedure.
Table 2: Determinants of SARA presence
I II
UK aid share 0.213*** 0.276***
(0.041) (0.051)
FR aid share -0.277*** -0.185***
(0.033) (0.046)
Total aid -0.014
(0.062)
Ex-UK Colony 0.846***
(0.166)
IMF mid-term 0.565***
(0.138)
IMF short-term -0.151
(0.241)
Trend 0.120***
(0.009)
N 1389 1232
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.509
Correctly specified (%) 85.9 88.9
Notes: The models report the estimated average par-
tial effects from a probit for the presence of a semi-
autonomous revenue authority. Column I reports the
baseline results from a probit model with UK and French
aid shares as the independent variables. Column II adds
control variables. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1.
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The first step of our IV estimation models the probability of the SARA reform as a function of the
agenda-setting power of the UK and France in country i, proxied for by their contribution to total aid
received by country i. The results from the first step probit model are given in Table 2. The reported
coefficients are the average partial effects. Column I only includes the aid shares, while column II adds
the controls. The predicted values from the second specification will be used in the 2SLS estimation.
The results shown here are merely illustrative. We will formally test the validity of the predicted
probabilities as instruments when we discuss Table 3.
Overall, the results are supportive of our model. We clearly see that the proposed instruments
are both correlated with SARA presence. Moreover, their apparent relation is consistent with our
intuition. The larger the UK as a donor the more likely is the presence of a SARA. More specifically, a
one percentage point increase in the UK’s aid share increases the probability of observing a SARA by
3.4 per cent (column II). The more agenda setting power France has, proxied by its share of aid, the
less likely is the presence of a SARA. It is important to note that we are controlling for the identity of
the former colonial power: former UK colonies are about 10 per cent more likely to adopt the SARA
reform than former colonies of other European states, implying that the estimates on the aid shares are
picking up more than structural differences between the two.5 Contrary to short-term programmes,
medium-term IMF programmes appear to increase the likelihood of a SARA reform. This is to be
expected given their more conditional nature and the IMF’s reputation as a supporter of the SARA
reform. Finally, the linear time trend is highly significant, which corresponds to the observation that
SARAs have increasingly been introduced since the 1990s.
Panel A in Table 3 reports the results from the 2SLS estimation, described in equation 4, for the
four different tax types. The first-stage results are found in Panel B. The key message here is that
when instrumenting SARA presence, our previous conclusion still holds. We do not find any statistical
evidence for a positive or negative impact of SARAs on tax revenue. The estimates do suggest that
medium-term IMF programmes have increased revenue from goods and services. This is plausible
given the IMF’s support to the introduction of VAT across the continent. Noteworthy, there is no
evidence for any correlation between total aid and taxation.
It is important to note that these results are not driven by weak instruments. It is clear from
the first-stage results that our instruments are significant predictors of SARA presence. The strong
predictive power of the instruments is also confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics, which are
always above 19. In addition, we run a placebo test to check the plausibility of our exclusion restriction.
We consider the effect of our instruments, the aid shares, on taxation when no SARA is present. If the
instruments are truly exogenous and thus only affect tax revenue through the SARA reform, then we
expect tax revenue to be uncorrelated with the aid shares when no SARA is present. Table A.6 in the
Appendix shows the results from a simple regression of tax revenue on the aid shares, controlling only
for time and country fixed effects, and shows that aid shares are uncorrelated with tax revenue. We are
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Table 3: 2SLS estimation - Revenue effect of SARAs
Total Direct G&S Trade
Panel A: 2SLS estimates
SARA -0.058 0.571 -0.240 -0.108
(0.180) (0.367) (0.328) (0.334)
Total aid 0.045 0.045 -0.122 0.072
(0.031) (0.055) (0.083) (0.055)
IMF mid-term 0.044 0.017 0.076** -0.016
(0.031) (0.072) (0.036) (0.058)
IMF short-term 0.059 0.125 0.018 0.022
(0.065) (0.126) (0.116) (0.111)
N 1139 926 912 944
Groups 42 40 42 41
KP F-stat 49.44 31.84 19.79 21.94
Panel B: First-stage regression
Pr(SARA) 0.931*** 0.798*** 0.715*** 0.734***
(0.132) (0.142) (0.161) (0.157)
Total aid 0.020 -0.035 -0.020 -0.017
(0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
IMF mid-term -0.047 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029
(0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
IMF short-term -0.002 0.043 0.039 0.029
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the effect of SARAs on tax rev-
enue. Panel A presents 2SLS estimates instrumenting SARA presence
with the predicted probability of SARA presence using UK and French
aid shares. Panel B presents the corresponding first-stage estimates. All
models include country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the country level. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p
≤ 0.1. The KP F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic which tests
the strength of the instruments.
thus confident that our instrumental variable approach and its conclusions are valid. The IV results
presented in this section further strengthen our scepticism about a positive revenue impact of SARAs
in sub-Saharan Africa.
In sum, the findings from the different models fail to provide support for the hypothesis that SARAs
have increased total tax revenues in sub-Saharan Africa on average. This contrasts with earlier find-
ings in the literature, and can be explained by the fact that previous studies failed to control for the
pre-reform trends in revenue collection. More specifically, as we argued above, if the SARA reform is
linked with a negative pre-reform shock to revenue, then this biases the SARA coefficient upwards in
a static model. In that case the static models most likely pick up a recovery effect which would have
occurred regardless of the SARA reform. We cannot be certain about the drivers of this null effect, and
reiterate that it is the average revenue effect. Two interpretations are possible: either SARAs never
work or the average is masking a heterogeneous effect which depends on the nature of the SARA, such
that “good” and “bad” SARAs cancel each other out. Further exploring the nature of different SARAs
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is beyond the scope of this paper, and would require currently unavailable data on both de jure and
de facto measures of their autonomy. We leave this for future research. However, it is clear from the
evidence that a revenue improvement is not a given.
4.3 Sensitivity Checks
We perform a number of sensitivity checks to assess the robustness of the lack of a systematic relation-
ship between the presence of a semi-autonomous revenue authority and revenue mobilisation. All of
these tests are reported in the Supplementary Materials to this paper. Specifically, we show that our
results are unchanged when:
(i) we recode our SARA dummies relying on the establishment dates used by Ahlerup et al. (2015),
with results in Table B.1;
(ii) we introduce additional controls, reported in Table B.2;
(iii) we use system GMM estimators with varying lags, reported in Table B.3 and Table B.4;
(iv) to address possible outliers, we trim the top and bottom 5 per cent of the dependent variable for
the dynamic models in Table B.5 and for the IV model in Table B.6.
5 Alternative Outcomes
Revenue performance is not the only criterion on which SARAs are advocated, so here we explore ef-
fects on a number of alternative outcome measures. Given the lack of evidence for a direct revenue
impact, we are led to the question whether SARAs have had more indirect effects on tax capacity across
sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst increasing revenue has been the primary objective of the reform, an IMF
survey documented additional reasons ranging from catalysing broader revenue reform to addressing
corruption (Kidd and Crandall, 2006). Moreover, there might be other benefits. Along with the rise of
SARAs we have, for example, seen the consolidation of professional networks of African tax adminis-
trators.6 The extent to which this has been driven by the creation of SARAs is an open question, but
given the organisational similarities it is not implausible that they have at least facilitated greater co-
operation. Assessing the overall impact of a SARA would thus require us to take into account a much
broader array of indicators. Unfortunately, this is not possible due to data limitations.
Instead, this section looks at tax effort, revenue volatility and corruption. The analyses of tax effort
and volatility can be thought of as robustness checks since they represent alternative revenue perfor-
mance measures. Moreover, they have been used as broader measures of the tax or fiscal capacity of a
state (e.g. Baskaran and Bigsten, 2013). Corruption, on the other hand, can be seen as an intermediate
outcome linking the SARA reform to revenue performance as corrupt tax administrations were one of
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the key elements identified as holding back revenue collection (Chand and Moene, 1999; Jenkins, 1994;
Flatters and Macleod, 1995). We first introduce the alternative outcome measures and then discuss
the results from our baseline model, the dynamic within estimator (results from all dynamic panel
estimators are included in the Supplementary Materials).
5.1 Tax Effort
The governmentâA˘Z´s tax effort is defined as the ratio between what is actually collected and what
should be collected given the economic structure of the country (Mkandawire, 2010; Baskaran and
Bigsten, 2013). One of the initial motivations for the SARA reform was the observed political inter-
ference in the tax collection process, leading to a shortfall between what should be levied and what
is collected. By granting tax administrations a level of autonomy, they are supposedly ring-fenced
from further interference. In turn, this should lead to a more effective application of tax rules, and
therefore the revenue gap should decrease, increasing the tax effort variable. The tax effort variable
is calculated as follows:
TaxEfforti,t =
Taxi,t
T̂ axi,t
(5)
T̂ axi,t = βXi,t + αi + δt + i,t (6)
where ̂Taxi,t is the countryâA˘Z´s taxable capacity, or its predicted total tax revenue given equation
6. This predicted revenue is the result of an estimation which takes into account country, αi, and
year, δt, fixed effects in addition to a vector, Xi,t, of economic determinants of taxation for country i
in year t. Following the literature (Bird, 2008; Brown and Martinez-Vazquez, 2015; Chelliah et al.,
1975; Le et al., 2012; Lotz and Morss, 1967; Mkandawire, 2010; Gupta, 2007), this vector includes
import and export measures to proxy for the economyâA˘Z´s trade openness, the value-added share of
the agricultural sector in the economy (being difficult to tax), GDP per capita, demographic variables
including the age dependency ratios for the young and old as well as the urbanisation rate. A ratio
lower than one suggests that a particular country is not collecting as much as it potentially could, while
a ratio higher than one points to a collection effort higher than what is predicted by the countryâA˘Z´s
economic structure. An additional advantage of using the tax effort is that it allows us to flexibly
include controls into our dynamic specifications. Including control variables in our baseline models
was challenging because of the limited number of observations in the individual time-series underlying
the CCEMG estimator. As before, we log-transform the tax effort variable.
17
5.2 Revenue Volatility
Fiscal policy is often highly dependent on the political cycle in developing countries (Shi and Svensson,
2006). According to von Haldenwang et al. (2014), this is, with regard to taxation, often worsened by
weak tax administrations. However, given their autonomy, SARAs are less influenced by the whims of
government, which should result in a steady collection of tax revenue. Thus, SARAs should reduce the
volatility in tax revenue.
Following von Haldenwang et al. (2014), we define revenue volatility as the absolute percentage
deviation, but from a three-year moving average instead of a quadratic trend. For every country i in
each year t we measure revenue volatility as follows:
V oli,t =
abs(Taxi,t − Taxi,t)
Taxi,t
(7)
where Taxi,t is the actual tax revenue collected and Taxi,t is a three-year moving average. Since we
are taking absolute values of the deviations from the moving average, our outcome measure is strictly
positive, with higher values indicating higher levels of volatility. In line with the rest of the paper we
log-transform our volatility measure to reduce the effect from outliers.
5.3 Corruption
Finally, we look at an intermediate variable linking the SARA reform to increased revenue, control of
corruption. By the end of the 1980s service provision by way of the public sector was heavily ques-
tioned as a model. The civil service in developing countries was argued to suffer from severe political
patronage.“In such a situation the tax administration will be perceived as being inefficient, incompe-
tent and corrupt [ ... this] directly affects the citizensâA˘Z´ willingness to voluntarily comply with the
tax laws” (Jenkins, 1994, p.76). Modelling tax administrations after independent central banks, i.e.
reducing political dependence and reforming managerial practices, especially with regard to human
resources, would lower corruption, increase professionalism and ultimately result in higher revenue
(Chand and Moene, 1999). Fjeldstad (2003) finds that, after the Tanzania Revenue Authority was
created, corruption initially decreased, but returned again over time.
To examine the corruption effect of SARAs we use three corruption measures from the recently
released Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset, version 7.1 (Coppedge et al., 2017). It has greater
coverage both across time and countries than alternatives, going back to 1900 in some cases. More-
over, V-DEM corruption measures can be disaggregated. So we are able to not only look at overall
political corruption, but also at public sector and executive corruption (McMann et al., 2016). Precise
data definitions can be found in Table A.3 in the Appendix. We examine all three indicators, but are
particularly interested in the public sector corruption index. This seems the most relevant, since it
explicitly attempts to get at the “use of public office for personal gain” in the bureaucracy.
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5.4 Results
To test these hypotheses, we rerun our baseline dynamic model presented in equation (1), but replace
the dependent variable with our alternative outcome variables. We only present the fixed effects model;
conclusions are unchanged when use the CCEMG estimator, reported in Tables B.7 in the Supplemen-
tary Materials.
In line with our previous findings, Table 4 provides no support for a significant effect of SARAs on
any of the alternative outcomes. The results from the estimation with the simple before/after SARA
dummy are presented in Panel A, while Panel B shows the evolution of the effect over time. The coeffi-
cients on the SARA dummies are generally close to zero, and nearly always insignificant. Only for tax
effort during the first two years after the establishment of the SARA do we find a marginally significant
(at the 10 per cent level) and positive impact of about 4 per cent. Regarding the tax effort estimation,
we note that the total number of countries has dropped to 41 since we are unable to estimate the tax
effort for Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, and Sao Tome and Principe due to missing data.
Table 4: Alternative outcomes - Within estimator
Political Public Sector Executive
Tax Effort Tax Volatility Corruption Corruption Corruption
I II III IV V
Panel A: SARA before-after
SARA 0.021 -0.094 -0.001 0.007 0.004
(0.023) (0.200) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
L.Tax effort 0.770***
(0.055)
L.Tax volatility 0.160***
(0.040)
L.Political corruption index 0.927***
(0.011)
L.Public sector corruption 0.905***
(0.015)
L.Executive corruption 0.921***
(0.013)
N 1040 1278 1610 1610 1610
Groups 41 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.614 0.032 0.879 0.837 0.854
Panel B: SARA over time
SARA, years 1-2 0.041* -0.157 0.001 0.003 0.000
(0.021) (0.294) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
SARA, years 3-5 0.009 0.166 0.003 0.007 0.007
(0.034) (0.210) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
SARA, years 6-10 0.023 -0.260 -0.004 0.006 0.001
(0.028) (0.268) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
SARA, years >10 -0.004 -0.184 -0.004 0.010 0.008
(0.028) (0.226) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
L.Tax effort 0.770***
(0.055)
L.Tax volatility 0.157***
(0.039)
L.Political corruption index 0.926***
(0.011)
L.Public sector corruption 0.905***
(0.015)
Continued on next page
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L.Executive corruption 0.921***
(0.013)
N 1040 1278 1610 1610 1610
Groups 41 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.613 0.033 0.879 0.837 0.854
Notes: The table reports the estimated effects of SARAs on several alternative outcome measures. (I) Tax effort
is measured as the ratio of actual tax collection over what should be collected given the economic structure of the
country. (II) Tax volatility is measured as the absolute percentage deviation of total tax revenue from a three-year
moving average. (III) Aggregate measure of political corruption. (IV) Combined measure of public sector bribery
and embezzlement. (V) Combined measure of executive bribery and embezzlement. Panel A includes a single before
and after dummy, taking the value 1 if a SARA is present. Panel B includes a series of SARA dummies capturing
post-treatment effects. All models account for country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the country level. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1.
This section broadened the scope of our assessment of semi-autonomous revenue authorities by
looking at their impact on a number of alternative indicators. The inclusion of tax effort and tax
volatility into the analysis can be interpreted as a robustness check on our baseline results. Moreover,
they are informative as broader measures of the state’s tax or fiscal capacity. Alternatively, control
of corruption can be seen as an intermediate outcome connecting the SARA reform to revenue perfor-
mance. However, the results fail to find any significant impact of semi-autonomous revenue authorities
on either tax effort, volatility or corruption. We take this as confirmation of our baseline results and
are therefore further strengthened in our belief that overall SARAs have done little to improve the tax
capacity of African states.
6 Conclusion
Over the past 30 years semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs) have been introduced across
sub-Saharan Africa. By ring-fencing tax administrations from politics and by introducing new public
management practices, this reform would boost tax collection. However, the empirical evidence on
the revenue effect of the SARA reform is limited and inconclusive. Moreover, this existing literature
fails to account for the trends in tax revenue prior to the introduction of a SARA. This leads to an
overestimation of the revenue effect of SARAs since the SARA reform often followed a negative revenue
shock.
This paper re-examines the revenue effect of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in sub-Saharan
Africa, taking into account these trends in pre-reform tax collection. We show that once these are
controlled for, the positive revenue effect of SARAs disappears. This result is consistent across different
dynamic panel estimators. Moreover, it holds true when we instrument for the presence of a SARA
using donor influence. Overall, there is little statistical evidence for a systematic relationship between
SARAs and total tax revenues in SSA. This is confirmed when we extend the analysis to alternative
measures of tax capacity: tax effort, revenue volatility, and corruption (one of the channels through
which SARAs are argued to raise revenue), are unaffected by their presence. Earlier estimations which
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omit past revenue are, therefore, most likely picking up a recovery effect, which would have occurred
anyway, as opposed to a causal revenue effect.
While SARAs do not demonstrably increase (or decrease) revenue collected on average, this does
not imply that SARAs may not provide other benefits. Some countries have introduced SARAs and
subsequently seen an increase in tax collection, but this should not simply be attributed to the SARA
in itself. Along with the rise of SARAs we have, for example, seen the consolidation of professional
networks of African tax administrators. Moreover, the scope of this paper was limited to the average
revenue effect of SARAs when compared to conventional tax administrations. The lack of an average
revenue effect might be masking heterogeneous effects depending on differences in de jure or de facto
autonomy across SARAs. Further contextualising the SARA reform in future research, therefore, has
the potential to provide us with a more detailed understanding of tax administration and institutional
reform in developing countries.
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Endnotes
1. Simply looking at the figure may give the impression that revenue increases following the SARA.
However, this does not allow for the suggestion of a general trend increase in revenue over the
full period, interrupted by some declines. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to include the
trend for control countries (no way to centre on 0) in the Figure, but this is allowed for in the
estimation.
2. Certain studies assume that Ghana has continuously had a SARA since the late 1980s. In
the 1980s Ghana had three separate semi-autonomous revenue administrations. However, their
autonomy was reversed as they were brought back into the ministry of finance in 1991, before
being legally re-instated in 1998 and operationally in 2001 (Prichard, 2009; Von Soest, 2008).
Full integration of the three authorities only came about in 2009 (GRA, 2009).
3. Almost immediately after establishing the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority economic crisis struck
Zimbabwe leading to a collapse in the tax ratio. Including Zimbabwe in the sample would bias
our estimation towards a null-result.
4. Other countries like South Sudan are considering the establishment of a SARA at the time of
writing.
5. We note that most non-British colonies that adopted SARAs are countries where the UK has
been a significant donor since the 1990s (notably Mozambique and Rwanda).
6. We thank the referees for bringing this to our attention.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: SARA creation dates in different studies
Country Operatio-
nal est.
Ebeke et
al. (2016)
Sar
(2016)
Ahlerup et
al. (2015)
ITD
(2010)
Fjeldstad &
Moore (2009)
Mann
(2004)
Angola 2015 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Botswana 2005 2003 n.a. 2005 2004 n.a. 2005
Burundi 2010 2010 n.a. 2010 2010 n.a. n.a.
Ethiopia 2009 1997 1997 2002 2009 2002 2002
Gambia 2007 2005 n.a. 2005 n.a. 2005 n.a.
Ghana 2010 1985 n.a. 1985 2010 1985 1986
Kenya 1996 1996 1995 1995 1995 1995 1996
Lesotho 2003 2001 2001 2003 n.a. 2003 2003
Liberia 2014 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malawi 2000 2000 1998 1995 2000 1995 2000
Mauritius 2005 2005 n.a. 2005 2006 2005 n.a.
Mozambique 2007 2006 n.a. 2006 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Rwanda 1998 1998 1997 1998 1998 1998 2000
Sierra Leone 2003 2003 n.a. 2002 2002 2002 2002
South Africa 1998 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997
Swaziland 2011 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tanzania 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
Togo 2014 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uganda 1992 1992 1991 1991 n.a. 1991 1992
Zambia 1994 1994 1994 1994 1993 1994 1994
Zimbabwe 2002 2001 2001 2001 n.a. 2001 2000
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Table A.2: Sources for SARA creation dates
Country Legal est. Operational est. Legal source Operat. Source*
Angola 15/12/2014 2015 http://www.agt.minfin.gov.ao Inferred
Botswana 01/08/2004 2005 http://www.burs.org.bw Inferred
Burundi 11/07/2009 2010 http://www.obr.bi http://www.obr.bi
Ethiopia 14/07/2008 2009 http://www.erca.gov.et Inferred
Gambia Aug-04 2007 IMF (2011) IMF (2011)
Ghana 31/12/2009 2010 http://www.gra.gov.gh Inferred
Kenya 01/07/1995 1996 http://www.kra.go.ke Mann (2004)
Lesotho 01/01/2001 2003 http://www.lra.org.ls http://www.lra.org.ls
Liberia 19/09/2013 2014 Yates (2014) Yates (2014)
Malawi 1998 2000 http://www.mra.mw/ http://www.mra.mw/
Mauritius 30/09/2004 2005 http://www.mra.mu Inferred
Mozambique 22/03/2006 2007 http://www.at.gov.mz http://www.at.gov.mz
Rwanda 08/11/1997 1998 http://www.rra.gov.rw IMF (1999)
Sierra Leone 13/09/2002 2003 http://www.nra.gov.s Inferred
South Africa 05/09/1997 1998 http://www.gov.za Inferred
Swaziland 2008 2011 http://www.sra.org.sz http://www.sra.org.sz
Tanzania 1995 1996 http://www.tra.go.tz http://www.tra.go.tz
Togo 10/12/2012 2014 https://www.otr.tg https://www.afdb.org
Uganda 05/09/1991 1992 https://www.ura.go.ug Mann (2004)
Zambia 1993 1994 http://www.zambia.gov.zm https://www.zra.org.zm
Zimbabwe 11/02/2000 2002 http://www.zimra.co.zw http://www.zimra.co.zw
Notes: *If no specific information is available, then the operational dummy is coded as one depending on the legal
establishment. Generally, legal and operational establishment years will be the same. However, if a SARA was legally
established in the second half of the calendar year, then the first year of operations is considered to be the next one.
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Table A.3: Variable definitions and sources
Variable Name Definition Source
SARA Dummy capturing the operational presence of a SARA. Author
Total taxes Total tax revenue, excluding social contributions (% of
GDP)
GRD
Direct taxes Total direct taxes, excluding social contributions but in-
cluding resource taxes. Includes taxes on income, profits
and capital gains, taxes on payroll and workforce and taxes
on property (% of GDP).
GRD
Taxes on goods &
services
Total taxes on goods and services, which include sales and
excise taxes (% of GDP).
GRD
Trade taxes Total taxes on international trade, including both import
and export taxes (% of GDP).
GRD
Total aid Net ODA received (% of GNI) WDI
UK aid share Net bilateral aid from UK (% of total net bilateral aid) WDI
FR aid share Net bilateral aid from France (% of total net bilateral aid) WDI
IMF mid-term Includes the following programmes: Extended Credit
Facility, External Fund Facility, Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility, Structural Adjustment Facility
Dreher (2006),
IMF MONA
IMF short-term Includes the following programmes: Stand-by Credit Fa-
cility, Rapid Credit Facility, Exogenous Shocks Facility,
Stand-By Arrangement
Dreher (2006),
IMF MONA
Ex-UK Colony Dummy variable taking the value one if the country is a
former UK colony, zero otherwise.
La Porta et al.
(2008)
Dep. share, old Age dependency ratio, old (% of working-age population) WDI
Dep. share, young Age dependency ratio, young (% of working-age popula-
tion)
WDI
Urban population Urban population (% of total) WDI
GDP per cap. GDP per capita (2010 USD) WDI
Exports Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI
Imports Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) WDI
Agriculture Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) WDI
Democracy index Aggregate measure of electoral democracy, scaled from 0
to 1, capturing the extent to which the ideal of electoral
democracy (=1) is achieved .
V-DEM
Political corruption Aggregate measure of political corruption, scaled from 0
to 1 with higher values corresponding to higher levels of
corruption.
V-DEM
Public sector corrup-
tion
Combined measure of public sector bribery and embezzle-
ment, scaled from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding
to higher levels of corruption.
V-DEM
Executive corrup-
tion
Combined measure of executive bribery and embezzle-
ment, scaled from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding
to higher levels of corruption.
V-DEM
Notes: GRD - Government Revenue Dataset; WDI - World Bank Development Indicators; IMF MONA - International
Monetary Fund Monitoring of Fund Arrangements; V-DEM - Varieties of Democracy.
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Table A.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
SARA 0.14 0.35 0 1 1656
Total tax 14.5 8.09 0.6 54.31 1496
Direct tax 4.76 3.82 0.12 28.11 1196
Goods and services tax 4.65 3.03 0 16.8 1178
Trade tax 4.52 4.60 0.03 36.41 1212
Total net aid 12.38 12.85 -0.26 181.1 1544
UK Aid 5.81 8.35 0 65.01 1626
FR aid share 20.17 22.47 0 94.92 1626
IMF mid-term 0.36 0.48 0 1 1656
IMF short-term 0.11 0.31 0 1 1649
Ex-UK Colony 0.42 0.49 0 1 1548
Age dependency ratio, old 6.25 1.54 3.85 14.09 1652
Age dependency ratio, young 83.33 13.51 27.46 106.71 1652
Urban population 34.26 16.27 4.34 87.16 1652
GDP per cap. 1817.52 2706.92 115.79 20333.94 1588
Exports 30.9 20.05 2.52 124.39 1482
Imports 43.87 33.69 2.98 424.82 1482
Agriculture 28.05 16.52 0.89 93.98 1324
Democracy index 0.36 0.21 0.04 0.86 1656
Tax effort 0.99 0.49 0.06 3.85 1090
Total tax 0.13 0.19 0 3.16 1331
Political corruption index 0.63 0.21 0.15 0.97 1656
Public sector corruption 0.64 0.23 0.05 0.98 1656
Executive corruption 0.63 0.24 0.06 0.98 1656
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Unit root test
In the analysis we assumed that the main variables follow a stationary process. This is not a trivial
assumption. The consistency of the estimators depends on it. We, therefore, formally test the station-
arity assumption using two panel unit root tests. Both tests extend the standard Dickey-Fuller test
to panel time-series. The null-hypothesis for both is non-stationarity in all country series, whereas
the alternative is stationarity in at least some countries. However, the Maddala and Wu (1999) test
does not take into account cross-section dependence, while the Pesaran (2007) allows for it. Table A.5
contains the results. We present alternative specifications for the inclusion of lags and trends. Overall,
the null of non-stationarity is mostly rejected.
Table A.5: Panel unit root tests
No trend With trend
0 lags 1 lag 0 lags 1 lag
Panel A: Total tax revenue
Maddala and Wu (1999) 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Pesaran (2007) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Direct tax revenue
Maddala and Wu (1999) 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
Pesaran (2007) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: Goods & services revenue
Maddala and Wu (1999) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004
Pesaran (2007) 0.000 0.130 0.002 0.961
Panel D: Trade tax revenue
Maddala and Wu (1999) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pesaran (2007) 0.000 0.073 0.183 0.929
Notes: Null-hypothesis for panel unit root test: series has a unit root.
P-values reported. Maddala and Wu (1999) assume cross-sectional inde-
pendence. Pesaran (2007) allows for cross-sectional dependence.
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Table A.6: Placebo IV test
Total Direct G&S Trade
UK aid share -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 -0.006
(0.015) (0.022) (0.027) (0.018)
FR aid share 0.002 0.031 0.050 0.014
(0.019) (0.034) (0.040) (0.034)
N 1065 826 788 823
Groups 46 44 46 46
adj. R2 0.069 0.005 0.190 0.050
Notes: The model estimates the impact of UK and French aid
on revenue for the countries and periods when no SARA is
present. No additional controls were included except for coun-
try and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered at the country level. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p
≤ 0.1.
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B Supplementary Materials
Table B.1: Dynamic panel - Alternative SARA dummy
Stat. FE Dyn. FE CCEMG
I II III IV V VI
Panel A: Total tax revenue
SARA 0.108*** 0.003 -0.001
(0.032) (0.019) (0.016)
SARA, years 1-2 0.091 0.023 0.006
(0.057) (0.034) (0.015)
SARA, years 3-5 0.100** 0.001 0.001
(0.049) (0.029) (0.030)
SARA, years 6-10 0.097** 0.001 -0.000
(0.043) (0.025) (0.037)
SARA, years >10 0.143*** -0.007 0.020
(0.045) (0.027) (0.037)
L.Total 0.781*** 0.781*** 0.314*** 0.307***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.088) (0.089)
N 1496 1496 1440 1440 1278 1278
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.084 0.083 0.674 0.673 0.274 0.299
CD p-val. 0.089 0.111
Panel B: Direct tax revenue
SARA 0.265*** 0.043 -0.035
(0.053) (0.030) (0.027)
SARA, years 1-2 0.213** 0.056 -0.002
(0.088) (0.048) (0.025)
SARA, years 3-5 0.204*** 0.026 -0.027
(0.075) (0.041) (0.037)
SARA, years 6-10 0.249*** 0.034 -0.043
(0.068) (0.037) (0.033)
SARA, years >10 0.485*** 0.088** -0.008
(0.076) (0.043) (0.041)
L.Direct 0.808*** 0.805*** 0.288*** 0.267***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.085) (0.087)
N 1196 1196 1134 1134 984 984
Groups 44 44 44 44 44 44
adj. R2 0.088 0.099 0.718 0.718 0.889 0.894
CD p-val. 0.066 0.034
Panel C: Goods & services revenue
SARA 0.095 0.006 0.029*
(0.058) (0.032) (0.016)
SARA, years 1-2 0.069 0.015 -0.055
(0.096) (0.053) (0.042)
SARA, years 3-5 0.061 -0.006 -0.013
(0.081) (0.044) (0.051)
SARA, years 6-10 0.142* 0.024 -0.066
(0.073) (0.040) (0.111)
SARA, years >10 0.079 -0.037 -0.233
(0.083) (0.046) (0.198)
L.Goods & Services 0.796*** 0.795*** 0.106 0.287
(0.017) (0.017) (0.166) (0.277)
N 1176 1176 1107 1107 928 928
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.157 0.156 0.737 0.737 0.433 0.455
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Panel D: Trade tax revenue
SARA 0.074 -0.035 -0.015
(0.065) (0.042) (0.037)
Continued on next page
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SARA, years 1-2 0.175 -0.010 0.043
(0.110) (0.072) (0.033)
SARA, years 3-5 0.158* -0.019 -0.018
(0.092) (0.059) (0.061)
SARA, years 6-10 -0.052 -0.065 -0.029
(0.083) (0.053) (0.077)
SARA, years >10 0.083 -0.017 -0.012
(0.093) (0.061) (0.089)
L.Trade 0.794*** 0.792*** 0.317*** 0.302***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.058) (0.063)
N 1212 1212 1144 1144 969 969
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.063 0.065 0.632 0.632 0.283 0.306
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. The SARA dummies
were constructed using SARA introduction years from Ahlerup et al. (2015). Panel A presents the esti-
mates for total tax revenue; Panel B for direct tax revenue; Panel C for revenue from goods and services
and Panel D for trade tax revenue. Uneven columns include a single before and after dummy, taking the
value 1 if a SARA is present. Even columns include a series of SARA dummies capturing post-treatment
effects. Models I through IV account for country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
(significance indicated as ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1). In models V and VI were corrected for small
time series bias using Jackknife corrected standard errors. The p-value of the cross-section dependence
(CD) test is reported. The null-hypothesis is no cross-sectional dependence in the majority of the models.
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Table B.2: Dynamic FE model with controls
Total Direct Goods & Services Trade
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
SARA 0.040 0.087* 0.072 -0.022
(0.029) (0.046) (0.069) (0.052)
SARA, years 1-2 0.057** 0.090** 0.094 0.036
(0.025) (0.035) (0.091) (0.062)
SARA, years 3-5 0.035 0.073 0.065 -0.041
(0.035) (0.049) (0.064) (0.063)
SARA, years 6-10 0.045 0.103 0.072 -0.053
(0.037) (0.065) (0.074) (0.059)
SARA, years >10 -0.005 0.098 -0.008 -0.047
(0.044) (0.070) (0.082) (0.062)
L.Total 0.685*** 0.683***
(0.072) (0.072)
L.Direct 0.722*** 0.722***
(0.056) (0.056)
L.Goods & Services 0.693*** 0.691***
(0.050) (0.051)
L.Trade 0.766*** 0.763***
(0.050) (0.051)
Age dep. ratio, old -0.138 -0.135 0.011 0.003 -0.157 -0.132 -0.009 0.009
(0.118) (0.120) (0.198) (0.207) (0.176) (0.178) (0.220) (0.225)
Age dep. ratio, young 0.244** 0.265** 0.279 0.276 -0.265 -0.244 0.126 0.129
(0.115) (0.115) (0.198) (0.204) (0.243) (0.241) (0.267) (0.271)
Urban population -0.070 -0.070 0.094 0.096 0.164 0.172 0.396** 0.391**
(0.098) (0.096) (0.153) (0.154) (0.156) (0.154) (0.179) (0.183)
GDP per cap. 0.069 0.074 0.032 0.030 -0.011 -0.011 -0.077 -0.074
(0.053) (0.052) (0.110) (0.110) (0.133) (0.132) (0.149) (0.150)
Exports 0.030 0.029 0.054 0.055 0.102* 0.103* -0.020 -0.021
(0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056)
Imports 0.080* 0.079* 0.073 0.073 0.019 0.017 0.157** 0.158**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.074) (0.074) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059) (0.061)
Agriculture -0.015 -0.021 -0.058 -0.057 -0.056 -0.059 0.037 0.039
(0.082) (0.083) (0.110) (0.111) (0.107) (0.106) (0.123) (0.124)
IMF short-term 0.049 0.050 -0.024 -0.025 -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005
(0.041) (0.042) (0.058) (0.057) (0.041) (0.042) (0.048) (0.050)
IMF mid-term -0.011 -0.013 -0.047** -0.047* 0.021 0.017 -0.058* -0.058*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.030) (0.031)
Democracy index 0.135* 0.140* 0.263* 0.262* -0.295** -0.283** 0.135 0.137
(0.077) (0.077) (0.132) (0.134) (0.109) (0.111) (0.130) (0.130)
N 1079 1079 890 890 891 891 893 893
Groups 41 41 40 40 42 42 41 41
Adj. R2 0.679 0.679 0.688 0.687 0.684 0.685 0.657 0.657
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. The dependent variables are listed at the top.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. All models include time and year fixed effects. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤
0.05, *p ≤ 0.1.
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Table B.3: System GMM - Revenue effect of SARAs
Total tax Direct tax Indirect tax Trade tax
I II III IV V VI VI VIII
SARA 0.013 0.046 0.016 0.023
(0.083) (0.049) (0.059) (0.051)
SARA, years 1-2 0.026 0.074 0.352 0.056
(0.076) (0.098) (0.227) (0.083)
SARA, years 3-5 -0.020 0.062 0.167 -0.019
(0.088) (0.098) (0.226) (0.051)
SARA, years 6-10 -0.039 0.072 0.211 0.077
(0.106) (0.121) (0.306) (0.089)
SARA, years >10 -0.040 -0.018 0.123 0.046
(0.077) (0.146) (0.344) (0.073)
L.Total 0.941*** 1.114***
(0.327) (0.351)
L.Direct 0.841*** 0.873***
(0.105) (0.125)
L.Goods & Services 0.933*** 0.937***
(0.104) (0.144)
L.Trade 1.039*** 1.046***
(0.077) (0.084)
N 1440 1440 1134 1134 1107 1107 1144 1144
Groups 46 46 44 44 46 46 46 46
# instr. 41 50 41 49 41 49 41 49
M1 0.037 0.025 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.041 0.032
M2 0.083 0.084 0.693 0.551 0.918 0.838 0.651 0.486
M3 0.172 0.162 0.481 0.533 0.043 0.063 0.192 0.267
Hans. p-val. 0.107 0.969 0.286 0.878 0.079 0.157 0.553 0.944
Diff. Hans. J 0.195 0.925 0.668 1.000 0.202 0.861 0.765 0.994
Notes: The table reports the results of a system GMM estimation of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. The system GMM
is chosen over the difference GMM since the SARA dummy is a persistent process and because past changes in the SARA dummy
convey reasonable information about its present level (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We collapse the columns of the instrument
matrix and restrict the number of lags on the dependent variable by setting h = 3, 4. We treat the SARA dummy as predetermined
and restrict the lags to 2,3. Uneven columns include a single before and after dummy, taking the value 1 if a SARA is present.
Even columns include a series of SARA dummies capturing post-treatment effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, the
Windmeijer (2005) correction was applied. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1. We report the p-values for the Hansen-J test, which
tests the overall validity of the instruments (null-hypothesis), as well as the p-value for the difference-in-Hansen test. The M1-M3
tests present the p-values of a serial correlation test for respectively a first, second and third-order autocorrelation process.
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Table B.4: System GMM - Alternative lag lengths
2 lags 3 lags 4 lags 10 lags
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Panel A: Total tax revenue
SARA 0.013 0.030 0.050 0.066
(0.083) (0.069) (0.074) (0.164)
SARA, years 1-2 0.026 0.053 -0.031 -0.688
(0.076) (0.132) (0.078) (0.466)
SARA, years 3-5 -0.020 -0.030 -0.113 -0.833
(0.088) (0.120) (0.100) (0.529)
SARA, years 6-10 -0.039 -0.040 -0.116 -0.836
(0.106) (0.133) (0.113) (0.874)
SARA, years >10 -0.040 -0.034 0.022 -0.766*
(0.077) (0.084) (0.305) (0.424)
L.Total 0.941*** 1.114*** 0.914*** 1.078*** 0.807*** 0.947*** 0.783*** 0.770***
(0.327) (0.351) (0.323) (0.363) (0.305) (0.330) (0.259) (0.277)
N 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
# instr. 41 50 43 54 45 57 57 70
M1 0.037 0.025 0.039 0.036 0.046 0.039 0.030 0.023
M2 0.083 0.084 0.082 0.086 0.080 0.085 0.112 0.269
M3 0.172 0.162 0.174 0.184 0.178 0.185 0.167 0.152
Hans. p-val. 0.107 0.969 0.272 0.967 0.353 0.976 0.855 1.000
Diff. Hans. J 0.195 0.925 0.146 0.800 0.130 0.533 0.133 0.628
Panel B: Direct tax revenue
SARA 0.046 0.035 0.040 -0.276
(0.049) (0.042) (0.039) (0.419)
SARA, years 1-2 0.074 -0.032 0.172 0.700
(0.098) (0.248) (0.381) (0.784)
SARA, years 3-5 0.062 -0.053 0.169 -0.807
(0.098) (0.265) (0.404) (0.882)
SARA, years 6-10 0.072 -0.056 0.202 -0.987
(0.121) (0.344) (0.505) (0.673)
SARA, years >10 -0.018 -0.126 0.163 0.408
(0.146) (0.415) (0.591) (0.617)
L.Direct 0.841*** 0.873*** 0.876*** 0.862*** 0.861*** 0.848** 0.950*** 0.464**
(0.105) (0.125) (0.106) (0.297) (0.120) (0.335) (0.161) (0.211)
N 1134 1134 1134 1134 1134 1134 1134 1134
Groups 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44
# instr. 41 49 43 53 45 56 57 69
M1 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.009
M2 0.693 0.551 0.690 0.668 0.691 0.622 0.761 0.149
M3 0.481 0.533 0.481 0.488 0.473 0.636 0.627 0.268
Hans. p-val. 0.286 0.878 0.254 0.959 0.427 0.990 1.000 1.000
Diff. Hans. J 0.668 1.000 0.663 0.990 0.681 1.000 1.000 1.000
Panel C: Goods & services revenue
SARA 0.016 0.060 0.061 0.091
(0.059) (0.052) (0.050) (0.295)
SARA, years 1-2 0.352 0.279 0.414 0.330
(0.227) (0.370) (0.501) (0.563)
SARA, years 3-5 0.167 0.095 0.247 0.257
(0.226) (0.371) (0.525) (0.545)
SARA, years 6-10 0.211 0.095 0.276 0.307
(0.306) (0.434) (0.608) (0.569)
SARA, years >10 0.123 0.082 0.239 0.289
(0.344) (0.503) (0.671) (0.579)
L.Indirect 0.933*** 0.937*** 0.942*** 1.016*** 0.939*** 0.974*** 0.967*** 0.962***
(0.104) (0.144) (0.080) (0.142) (0.080) (0.246) (0.143) (0.206)
N 1107 1107 1107 1107 1107 1107 1107 1107
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
# instr. 41 49 43 53 45 56 57 69
M1 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.125 0.004 0.013
M2 0.918 0.838 0.912 0.835 0.911 0.665 0.627 0.627
M3 0.043 0.063 0.045 0.069 0.044 0.096 0.028 0.180
Hans. p-val. 0.079 0.157 0.098 0.736 0.246 0.975 0.915 0.999
Diff. Hans. J 0.202 0.861 0.107 0.300 0.113 0.715 1.000 1.000
Panel D: Trade tax revenue
SARA 0.023 0.022 0.003 -0.213
(0.051) (0.043) (0.046) (0.349)
SARA, years 1-2 0.056 -0.261 -0.486 0.657
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(0.083) (0.926) (0.533) (0.839)
SARA, years 3-5 -0.019 -0.321 -0.550 0.558
(0.051) (0.994) (0.577) (0.923)
SARA, years 6-10 0.077 -0.379 -0.633 0.748
(0.089) (1.111) (0.672) (1.101)
SARA, years >10 0.046 -0.306 -0.542 0.632
(0.073) (1.276) (0.909) (1.275)
L.Trade 1.039*** 1.046*** 1.044*** 0.993*** 1.059*** 0.931*** 0.969*** 0.926***
(0.077) (0.084) (0.080) (0.172) (0.099) (0.199) (0.143) (0.195)
N 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
# instr. 41 49 43 53 45 56 57 69
M1 0.041 0.032 0.046 0.067 0.047 0.055 0.040 0.051
M2 0.651 0.486 0.678 0.638 0.680 0.678 0.602 0.607
M3 0.192 0.267 0.193 0.173 0.204 0.188 0.173 0.929
Hans. p-val. 0.553 0.944 0.074 0.915 0.089 0.954 0.970 1.000
Diff. Hans. J 0.765 0.994 0.105 1.000 0.076 0.611 1.000 0.385
Notes: The table reports the results of a system GMM estimation of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. Alternative lag
lengths were used as shown at the top. Panel A presents the estimates for total tax revenue; Panel B for direct tax revenue; Panel C for
revenue from goods and services and Panel D for trade tax revenue. Uneven columns include a single before and after dummy, taking
the value 1 if a SARA is present. Even columns include a series of SARA dummies capturing post-treatment effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, the Windmeijer (2005) correction was applied. ***p≤ 0.01, **p≤ 0.05, *p≤ 0.1. We report the p-values for the
Hansen-J test, which tests the overall validity of the instruments (null-hypothesis), as well as the p-value for the difference-in-Hansen
test. The M1-M3 tests present the p-values of a serial correlation test for respectively a first, second and third-order autocorrelation
process.
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Table B.5: Dynamic panel - Trimmed
Stat. FE Dyn. FE CCEMG
I II III IV V VI
Panel A: Total tax revenue
SARA 0.052** 0.007 -0.003
(0.023) (0.014) (0.020)
SARA, years 1-2 0.051 0.029 -0.035
(0.038) (0.022) (0.059)
SARA, years 3-5 0.066* -0.001 0.006
(0.034) (0.021) (0.042)
SARA, years 6-10 0.070** 0.011 -0.014
(0.033) (0.020) (0.063)
SARA, years >10 0.000 -0.022 -0.006
(0.036) (0.022) (0.069)
L.Total 0.771*** 0.771*** 0.342*** 0.247***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.067) (0.078)
N 1348 1348 1262 1262 1054 1054
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.099 0.100 0.660 0.660 0.300 0.346
CD p-val. 0.029 0.058
Panel B: Direct tax revenue
SARA 0.217*** 0.059** 0.009
(0.038) (0.024) (0.027)
SARA, years 1-2 0.194*** 0.072** 0.047
(0.059) (0.036) (0.048)
SARA, years 3-5 0.172*** 0.036 0.054
(0.052) (0.031) (0.058)
SARA, years 6-10 0.259*** 0.069** 0.044
(0.053) (0.033) (0.073)
SARA, years >10 0.317*** 0.079** 0.014
(0.062) (0.038) (0.106)
L.Direct 0.755*** 0.753*** 0.277*** 0.261***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.085) (0.084)
N 1078 1078 1006 1006 854 854
Groups 43 43 43 43 43 43
adj. R2 0.176 0.178 0.688 0.687 0.956 0.959
CD p-val. 0.002 0.001
Panel C: Goods & services revenue
SARA 0.128*** 0.047* 0.040
(0.041) (0.027) (0.037)
SARA, years 1-2 0.078 0.092** 0.018
(0.061) (0.040) (0.110)
SARA, years 3-5 0.151*** 0.030 0.241**
(0.055) (0.035) (0.108)
SARA, years 6-10 0.187*** 0.045 0.259*
(0.057) (0.037) (0.135)
SARA, years >10 0.021 -0.018 0.224*
(0.065) (0.042) (0.130)
L.Goods & Services 0.703*** 0.702*** 0.216 0.251
(0.022) (0.022) (0.147) (0.193)
N 1060 1060 970 970 765 765
Groups 46 46 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.166 0.170 0.614 0.615 0.319 0.375
CD p-val. 0.004 0.001
Panel D: Trade tax revenue
SARA -0.072 -0.077** -0.088*
(0.046) (0.032) (0.049)
SARA, years 1-2 0.064 -0.043 -0.005
(0.069) (0.050) (0.025)
SARA, years 3-5 -0.030 -0.063 -0.013
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(0.062) (0.043) (0.049)
SARA, years 6-10 -0.109* -0.091** -0.080
(0.064) (0.045) (0.072)
SARA, years >10 -0.382*** -0.165*** -0.113
(0.069) (0.049) (0.115)
L.Trade 0.725*** 0.714*** 0.129 0.064
(0.022) (0.023) (0.104) (0.101)
N 1091 1091 1013 1013 832 832
Groups 45 45 45 45 45 45
adj. R2 0.055 0.086 0.556 0.557 0.637 0.656
CD p-val. 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of SARAs on the log of tax revenue. The original sample
was trimmed at the top and bottom 5th percentile. Panel A presents the estimates for total tax revenue;
Panel B for direct tax revenue; Panel C for revenue from goods and services and Panel D for trade tax
revenue. Uneven columns include a single before and after dummy, taking the value 1 if a SARA is
present. Even columns include a series of SARA dummies capturing post-treatment effects. Models I
through VI account for country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. In models V and
VI Windmeijer (2005)’s finite sample correction was applied. Whereas models VII and VIII were corrected
for small time series bias using Jackknife corrected standard errors. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1.In
models V and VI were corrected for small time series bias using Jackknife corrected standard errors. The
p-value of the cross-section dependence (CD) test is reported. The null-hypothesis is no cross-sectional
dependence in the majority of the models.
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Table B.6: 2SLS estimation - Trimmed
Total Direct G&S Trade
Panel A: 2SLS estimates
SARA -0.172 0.359 -0.404 -0.256
(0.141) (0.279) (0.285) (0.292)
Total aid 0.030 -0.011 -0.091 0.081
(0.032) (0.041) (0.070) (0.055)
IMF mid-term 0.046 0.031 0.078* 0.018
(0.032) (0.064) (0.045) (0.053)
IMF short-term 0.055 0.195* 0.081 -0.036
(0.065) (0.109) (0.103) (0.081)
N 1044 857 845 876
Groups 42 38 41 40
KP F-stat 43.92 36.70 24.03 27.36
Panel B: First-stage regression
Pr(SARA) 0.907*** 0.835*** 0.795*** 0.792***
(0.137) (0.138) (0.162) (0.151)
Total aid 0.004 -0.031 -0.030 -0.032
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
IMF mid-term -0.038 -0.033 -0.007 -0.021
(0.036) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042)
IMF short-term 0.024 0.051 0.075** 0.056
(0.035) (0.042) (0.038) (0.036)
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the effect of SARAs on tax rev-
enue. The original sample was trimmed at the top and bottom 5th per-
centile. Panel A presents 2SLS estimates instrumenting SARA presence
with the predicted probability of SARA presence using UK and French
aid shares. Panel B presents the corresponding first stage estimates. All
models include country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the country level. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p
≤ 0.1. The KP F-stat reports the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic which tests
the strength of the instruments.
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Table B.7: Alternative outcomes - CCEMG
Political Public Sector Executive
Tax Effort Tax Volatility Corruption Corruption Corruption
I II III IV V
Panel A: SARA before-after
SARA -0.004 -0.290 -0.004 -0.013 -0.013
(0.017) (0.658) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
L.Tax effort 0.410***
(0.069)
L.Tax volatility -0.189
(0.165)
L.Political corruption index 0.689***
(0.033)
L.Public sector corruption 0.704***
(0.030)
L.Executive corruption 0.759***
(0.035)
N 912 1123 1472 1472 1472
Groups 41 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.721 0.113 0.622 0.529 0.639
CD p-val. 0.375 0.499 0.003 0.010 0.039
Panel B: SARA over time
SARA, years 1-2 0.008 -0.662 -0.026 -0.011 -0.015
(0.020) (0.551) (0.025) (0.014) (0.011)
SARA, years 3-5 0.003 -0.564** -0.021 -0.036 -0.015
(0.022) (0.229) (0.017) (0.022) (0.014)
SARA, years 6-10 0.001 -0.080 -0.015 -0.032* -0.027
(0.018) (0.417) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021)
SARA, years >10 -0.011 -0.768** -0.055 -0.057* -0.027
(0.020) (0.316) (0.037) (0.030) (0.033)
L.Tax effort 0.306***
(0.071)
L.Tax volatility -0.227
(0.164)
L.Political corruption index 0.665***
(0.035)
L.Public sector corruption 0.634***
(0.036)
L.Executive corruption 0.750***
(0.040)
N 912 1123 1472 1472 1472
Groups 41 46 46 46 46
adj. R2 0.733 0.171 0.637 0.552 0.653
CD p-val. 0.949 0.593 0.004 0.111 0.010
Notes: The table reports the estimated effects from a CCEMG model of SARAs on several alternative outcome mea-
sures. (I) Tax effort is measured as the ratio of actual tax collection over what should be collected given the economic
structure of the country. (II) Tax volatility is measured as the absolute percentage deviation of total tax revenue
from a three-year moving average. (III) Aggregate measure of political corruption. (IV) Combined measure of public
sector bribery and embezzlement. (V) Combined measure of executive bribery and embezzlement. Panel A includes a
single before and after dummy, taking the value 1 if a SARA is present. Panel B includes a series of SARA dummies
capturing post-treatment effects. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for small time series bias using Jackknife
corrected standard errors. ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.1. The p-value of the cross-section dependence (CD) test is
reported. The null-hypothesis is no cross-sectional dependence in the majority of the models.
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